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Memorandum of MR. J USTICE
The threshold question to be'Geeided is whether Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq.,
provides for a private cause of action. I am unwilling merely
to "assume" an affirmative answer for purposes of this case.
If in fact no private cause of action exists. this Court and the
lower courts as well are without jurisdiction to consider petitioner's Title VI claim. As I see it, if we are not obliged to
do so, it is at least advisable to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 229
(1938). 1 Furthermore, just as it is inappropriate to address
Griffin a.lso held that "lack of jurisdiction . . . touching the subject.
matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the pa,rtie; .... " 303 U. S.,
at 229. See also Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U. S.
274, 278 (1977); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149,
152 (1908); Mansfield, Coldwaler & Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379,382 (1884) .
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), we did adjudicate a. Title VI
claim brought by a class of individuals. But. neither the Court, the parties, nor the numerous amici curiae addressed the private ca.use of action
issue. In addition, the understanding of MR . .TusTJCE STEWART'S concurring opinion, which observed that standing was not being contested, was
tha.t. the standing aJleged by petitioners was as third-party beneficiaries of
the funding contract between the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and the San Francisco United School Di:,;trict, a. theory not all eged
by the present. petitioner. Id .. at. 571 n. 2. Furthermore,, the plaintiff:,; in
Lau,. alleged jurisdi_ction under 42. U. S. C. § 1983 rather than directly
1
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

constitutional issues without determining whether statutory
grounds urged before us are dispositive, it is at least questionable practice to adjudicate a novel and difficult statutory issue
without first considering whether we have jurisdiction to
decide it. Consequently I begin by addressing the question
of whether petitioner may bring suit under Title VI.
A private cause of action under Title VI would. in terms
both of the Civil Rights Act as a whole and that title, not be
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme" and contrary to the legislative intent. Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66. 78 (1975). Title II, 42 U.S. C. § 2000a et seq.,
dealing with public accommodations, and Title VII, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., dealing with employment, proscribe
private discriminatory conduct that as of 1964 neither the
Constitution 1101: other federal statutes had been construed
to forbid. Both titles carefully provided for private actions
as well as for official participation in enforcement. Title III,
42 U. S. C. § 2000b et seq., and Title IV, 42 U. S. C. § 2000c
et seq., dealing with public facilities and public education,
respectively, authorized suits by the Attorney General to
eliminate racial discrimination in these sectors. Because
suits to end discrimination in public facilities and public education were already available under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, it was.
of course, unnecessary to provide for private actions under
Titles III and IV. But each title carefully provided that
its provisions for public actions would not adversely affect
pre-existing private remedies. §§ 2000b-2 and 2000c-8.
under the provisions of Title VI , ns d0€S the petitioner in this cnse. Although the Court undoubtedly hnd nn obligat.ion to con:sider the jurisdictional question. this is surely not the first instnnce in which the Court
)111,:: bypas::;ed a jurisdictional problem not presented by the pnrtie,;. Cert,ninly the Court.'s ~ilence on t-he jurisdictional que::;tion , when con:sidered
in the context of the indifference o.f the litigants to it nnd the fact thnt
jurio1diction was alleged under § 1983, does not. foreclose n r~o1oned conclusion tbat Title VI atfqrcl(i no _private ca\1se of action .

-

I -(fiA/2(, .

-

f6-8il-MEMO (A)

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

-

3

The role of Title VI was to terminate federal fu1ancial
support for public and private institutions or programs that
discriminated on the basis of race. Section 601 , 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d , imposed the proscription that no person , on the
grounds of race, color or national origin , was to be excluded
from or discriminated against under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. But there is no express
provision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would
be quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to
the matter of private actions in other titles of the Act,
intended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce
Title VI.
It is also evident from the face of § 602. 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d-1. that Congress intended the departments and agencies to define and to refine, by rule or regulation , the general
proscription of § 601, subject only to judicial review of agency
action in accordance with established procedures. Section
602 provides for enforcement : every federal department or
agency furnishing financial support is to implement the
proscription by appropriate rule or regulation, each of which
requires approval by the President. Termination of funding
as a sanction for noncompliance is authorized but only after
a hea.ring and after the failure of voluntary means to secure
compliance. Moreover, termination may not take place until
the department or agency involved files with the appropriate
-committees of the House and Senate a full written report of
the circumstances and the grounds for such action and 30
days have elapsed thereafter. Judicial review was provided,
at least for actions terminating financial assistance.
Termination of funding was regarded by Congress as a
serious enforcement step, and the legislative history is replete
with assurances that it would not occur until every possibility
for conciliation had been exhausted. 2 To allow a private
2 "Yet, before that principle rthat 'Federal funds a re not to be u~ed to
support racial dbcrimination'J is implemented to the detriment of any
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iudividual to sue to cut off funds under Title VI would compromise these assurances and short circuit the procedural preconditions provided in Title VI. If the Federal Government
may not cut off funds except pursuant to an agency rule,
approved by the President. and presented to the appropriate
committee of Congress for a layover period. and after voluntary means to achieve compliance have failed. it is inconceivable that Congress intended to permit individuals to
satisfy these administrative prerequisites themselves.

-

-

per::;on , agency, or State, regulations giving notice of what conduct is required must be drawn up by the ngenc~· administering the program . . . .
Before such regulations become effective, they must be submitted to and
approved by the President .
"Once having become effective, there is still a long road to travel before
any sanction whatsoever is imposed. Formal action to compel compliance
can only take place after the following has occurred: first, there must be
,an unsuccessful attempt to obtain voluntary compliance; second, there
must be an administrative hearing; third, a writ.ten report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action must be filed with the appropriate
committees of the House and Senate; and fourth, 30 da.ys must have
elapsed between such filing and the action denying benefits under a Federal program. Finally, even that act.ion is by no means final because it
is subject to judicial review and can ,b e further postponed by judicial
action granting temporary relief pending review in order to avoid irreparable injury. It would be difficult indeed t-0 concoct any additional safeguards to incorpornte in such a procedure." 110 Cong. Rec. 6749 (Sen.
Moss).
" [T]he authority to cut off funds is hedged about with a. number of
procedural restrictions. [There follows detail of the preliminary steps.]
In short, title VI is a reasonable, moderate, cautious, carefully worked out
solution to a situation that cle:ul~· c!llb for legi:slative action." Id., at
6544 (Sen. Humphre~·). '·Actuall~·, 110 action u•hatsoever can be tilken
against anyone until the Federal agency involved has advised the appropriate person of his failure to comply with nondiscrimination requirements
and until voluntary efforts to secure compliance have failed." Representative Celler (id., at 1519) (emphasis added). See also remarks of Senator
Ribicoff (id., at 7066-7067); Senator Proxmire (id., at 8345); Sena.t or
Kuchel (id., at 6562) . These safeguards were incorporated into 42 U.S. C.
§'2000d-1 (1970) .

-

"16-811-MEMO (A'
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

•

5

Furthermore, although Congress intended Title VI to end
federal financial support for racially discriminatory policies
of not only public but a.lso private institutions and programs,
it is extremely unlikely that Congress, without a word indicating that it intended to do so, contemplated creating an independent, private statutory cause of action against all private
as well as public agencies that might be in violation of the
section. There is no doubt that Congress regarded private
litigation as an important tool to attack discriminatory practices. It does not at all follow, however, that Congress anticipated new private actions under Title VI itself. Wherever
a discriminatory program was a public undertaking, such as
a public school, both priva.te and official remedies were already
available under other statutes, and a Title VI remedy was
unnecessary. Furthermore, there was frequent reference to
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959
(CA4 1963), cert. denied , 376 U. S. 938 (1964), throughout
the congressional deliberations. See. e. g., 110 Cong. Rec.
6544 (Sen. Humphrey). Simkins held that under appropriate circumstances. a private hospital with "massive use of
public funds and extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan" was an integral part of a joint state and federal
plan a.nd hence represented "state action" for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. Again. it would be
unnecessary to create a Title VI private action against private discriminators where they were already within the reach
of existing 1xiva.te remediPs. And if and when they were
not-a.nd Simkins disclaimed holding that "everv subvention
bv the federal or state governmPnt a11tomatic9 llv involvPs the
beneficiary in 'state action.'" id ., at 967 3-it is difficult to
3 This Court has never held that the merr receipt of federal or state
funds is suffi<·ient to constitute the recipient a federal or state actor for
Fif~h Amendment or§ 1983 purposes. In Norwood v. Harrison, ;113 U.S.
455 (1973) , private schools that received state aid were held sub.iect to
the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on discrimination, but the Court's test

-
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believe that Congress silently created a private remedy to terminate conduct that previously had been entirely beyond the
reach of the federal law.
For those who believe. contrary to my views. that Title VI
was intended to create a stricter standard of color blindness
than the Constitution itself requires, the result of no private
cause of action follows even more readily. Because in that
case Congress must be seen to have banned degrees of discrimination, as well as types of discriminators, not previously
reached by law. A Congress careful enough to provide that
existing private causes of action would be preserved (in.
Titles III and IV) would not leave for inference a vast new
extension of private enforcement )ower. And a Congress so
excep 10na y concerned with procedural preliminaries before
fund recipients were faced with the choice of a cut-off or of
stopping discriminating would not permit private parties to
required "tangible financial aid" with a. "significant tendency to facilitate,
reinforce, and support. private discrimination." 413 U. S., at 466. The
mandate of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 722'
( 1961), to sift facts a.nd weigh circumstances of governmental support in
each case to determine whether private or state action was involved, has·
not been abandoned for an automatic n1le based on receipt of funds .
Contemporaneous with the congrn,sional debates on the Civil Rights
Act was this Court'~ deci~ion in Griffin v. & hool B oard, 377 U. S. 218
(1964). Tuition grants and tax conce~~iom; were provided for parents
of student::; in private schoob. even if the school~ discriminated ra cially.
The Court found sufficient state action, but ca.refully limited its holding
to the circumstances presented: "closing the Prince Edwa.rd schools and
meanwhile contributing to the support of the private segregated white·
school that took their place denied petitioners the equal protection of the
laws." 377 U. S., at 232.
Hence, neither at. the time of the e11actment of Title YI, nor at the·
present time to thr rxtPnt this Court has spoken, ha,; rnerr receipt of
state funds created stat e action . :.\foreover, Simkins has not, met with
universal approval among the circuit court;; of a.p peab. See cases cited _
in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 423 U. S. 1000, 1004 (1975);
~WHrrE, J ., dissenting from denial of cert..).

Iv~
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pose precisely that same dilemma in a greatly \\idened category of cases with no procedural requirements whatsoever.
Significantly, in at lea.st three instances legislators who
played a major role in the passage of Title VI explicitly stated ~
that a private right of action under Title VI does not exist. 4
As an "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one," Cort v. Ash,
422 U. S. 66. 78, clearer statements cannot be imagined. and
under Cort, "an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action
[is] controlling." Id. , at 82. Senator Keating. for example,
proposed a private "right to sue" for the "person suffering
from discrimination" ; but the Department of Justice refused
to include it, and the Senator acquiesced. 5 These are not
neutral, ambiguous statements. They indicate the absence of
a legislative intent to create a private remedy. :Nor do any
of these statements make nice distinctions between a private
cause of action to en.join discrimination and one to cut off
funds. Indeed , it would be odd if they did, since the practical effect of either type of private cause of action would be
identical. If private suits to enjoin conduct allegedly violative of § 601 were permitted, recipients of federal funds would
4 "Nowhere in this sect ion do you find a comparable right of legal action
for a person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in the
benefits of federal fund,;. :\iowhere. Only those who have been cut off
ca n go to court and present their claim." 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (Rep.
Gill). "[A] good ca.-,e could be made that a, remedy i:; provided for the
State or loca l official who is practicing discrimination, but none i:s provided for the victim of the di;;crimination. " Id. , at 6568 (Sen. Kut chel) .
"Pa renthetically, while we favored the inclu,;ion of the right to sue on the
part of thr. agencr, the Stat.e, or t-he facility which was deprived of federal fund;; . we also favored the inclu;;ion of a provision granting the right
to sue to the person suffering from discrimination . This wa,; not included
in the bill. However, both the Senator from Connecticut and I a.re grateful that our other suggest-ion.-, were ndopted by the Ju;;tice DepartmenL"
Id., at 7065 (Sen. Kea.t ing).
5
Id., a.t 7065.

-
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be presented with the choice of either ending what the court,
rather than the a.gency. detern1ined to be a discriminatory
practice within the meaning of Title VI, or refusing federal
funds and thereby escaping from the statute's jurisdictional
premise.G This is precisely the same choice which would confront recipients if suit was brought to cut off funds. Both
types of actions would equally jeopardize the administra.tive
processes so carefully structured into the law. This Court
has always required "that the inference of such a private
cause of action not otherwise authorized by statute must be
consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course,
with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served
by the Act." National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453. 458 (1974).
See also Securities Investors Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U. S. 412, 418-420 (1975). A private cause of action under
Title VI is unable to satisfy either prong of this test.

µ

,,

,,1/

II

~

Since a majority of the Court decides or assumes ~
urposes of this case that private actions m~y'""b e bl-ought under
Title VI, I address the substantive statutory question of
whether Title VI bars recipients of federal funds from giving
preferential consideration to economically disadvantaged
members of racial minorities as part of a program designed to
enable such individuals to surmount the obstacles imposed by
their racial and economic status.7 In my view, Title VI proG As Sena.tor Ribicoff st:itcd, "Som<'times those eligible for Federal assistance may elect to reject such a.id , unwilling to agree to a nondiscrimination requirement. If they choose that course, the responsibility is theirs."
Id ., at 7066.
7 Tit.le VI provides:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, ot
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
- receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U. S. C. § ·20ood.
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hibits only those uses of racl!ll
~riteria that would violate the
--we
Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies;
it does not oar"lJie preferential treatment of racial minorities
as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the
extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The legislative history of Title VI, administrative regulations interpreting the statute, subsequent congressiona.l and executive action, and the prior decisions of this
Court compel this conclusion. None of these sources lends
support to the proposition that Congress intended to bar all
race conscious efforts to extend the benefits of federally
financed programs to minorities who have been historically
excluded from the full benefits of American life.
A

•

-

It would require strong evidence of legislative intent to
establish that Congress has prohibited state agencies and private institutions from voluntarily considering race in a manner consistent with the Constitution, in order to eliminate
racial segregation and to eradicate the effects of racial discrimination. I find no significant evidence of such an intent.
An examination of the history of Title VI from the time
President Kennedy requested that Congress grant executive
departments and agencies authority to cut off federal funds
supporting programs administered in a manner that violated
the constitutional rights of blacks until the final enactment
of legislation incorporating his proposals reveals one fixed
purpose: to give the Executive Branch of Government clear
authority to terminate the expenditure of federal funds to
support activities and programs that use race as a means of
disadvantaging minorities in a manner prohibited by the
Constitution.
This purpose was first expressed in President Kennedy's
June 19, 1963, message to Congress proposing the legislation

✓

-
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that subsequently became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8
Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, and the floor manager of the legislation in the
House, introduced Title VI in words unequivocally expressing the intent to provide the Federal Government with the
means of assuring that its funds were not used to subsidize
racial discrimination inconsistent with the standards imposed

-

-

8 "Simple justice requires that public funds, t-0 which all taxparers of all
races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches,
subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination. Direct discrimination by
Federal, State, or local governments is prohibited by the Constitution.
But indirect discrimination, through the use of Federal funds, is just as
invidious ; and it should not be necessa.ry to resort to the courts to prevent
each individual violation. Congress and the Executive have their responsibilities t-0 uphold the Constitution also ....
"Ma~y sta.tutes providing Federal financial assistance, however, define
with such precision both the administrator's role and the conditions upon
which specified amounts shall be given to designated recipients that the
a.mount of administrative discretion remaining-which might be used to
withhold finds if discrimina.tion were not ended-is at best questionable.
No administrator has the unlimited authority to invoke the Constitution
in opposition to the mandate of the Congress. Nor would it always be
helpful to require · unconditionally-as is often proposed-the withdrawal
of all Federal funds from programs urgently needed by Negroes as well
as whites ; for this may only penalize those who least deserve it without
ending discrimina.tion.
"Instea.d of permitting this issue to become a political device often
exploited by those opposed to social or economic progress, it would be
better at this time to pass a single comprehensive provision making it clear
that the Federal Government is not required, under any statute, t-0 furnish
any kind of financial assistance-by way of grant, loan, contract, guaranty,
insurance or otherwise-to any program or activity in which racial discrimination occurs. This would not permit the Federal Government to
cut off all Federal aid of all kinds as a means of punishing an a,rea for
the discrimination occurring therein-but it would clarify the authority
of any administrator with respect to Federal funds or financial assistance
and discriminatory practices." 109 Cong. Rec. 1161.

76-811-MEMO (A)
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by the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments upon state and
federal action.
"The bill would offer assurance tha.t hospitals financed
by Federal money would not deny adequate care to
Negroes. It would prevent abuse of food distribution
programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied
food surplus supplies when white persons were given such
food. It would assure Negroes the benefits now accorded
only white students in programs of high education
financed by Federal funds. It would , in short, assure the
existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of
Federal funds. It would not destroy any rights of private
property or freedom of association." 110 Cong. Rec. 1519.

-

-

It was clear to Representat1ve Celler that Title VI, apart from
the fact that it reached all federally funded ac.tivities even in
the absence of sufficient state or federal control to invoke the
Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments, was not placing new substantive limitations upon the use of racial criteria but rather
was designed to apply "the existing right to equal treatment"
enjoyed by blacks by virtue of the Constitution. Representative Celler later specifically defined the purpose of Title VI as
preventing the use of federal funds to subsidize racial discrimination in violation of the standards contained in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"In general, it seems rather anomalous that the Federal
Government should aid and abet discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin by granting money
and other kinds of financial aid. It seems rather shock.ing, moreover, that while we have on the one hand the
14th amendment. which is supposed to do away with
discrimination since it provides for equal protection of the
laws, on the other hand, we have the Federal Government
aiding and abetting those who persist in practicing racial
discrimination.

-
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"It is for these reasons that we bring forth title VI. The
enactment of title VI will serve to override specific provisions of law which contemplate Federal assistance to
ra.cially segregated institutions." Id., at 2467.

-

-

Representative Celler also filed a legal memorandum setting
forth the legal basis for the enactment of Title VI which
reiterated the theme of his oral remarks: "In exercising its
authority to fix the terms on which Federal funds will be
disbursed . . . , Congress clearly has power to legislate so as
to insure that the Federal Government does not become
·involved in a violation of the Constitution ." Id., at 1528.
Other sponsors of the legislation agreed with Representative
' Celler that the function of Title VI was to end the Federal
Government's complicity in conduct. particularly the segregation or exclusion of Negroes, inconsistent with the standards to be found in the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Constitution . Representative Lindsay, also a member of the
Judiciary Committee. candidly acknowledged. in the course of
·explaining why Title VI was necessary, that it did not create
any new standard of equal treatment beyond that contained
in the Constitution:
"Both the Federal Government and the States are under
constitutional mandates not to discriminate. Many have
raised the question as to whether legislation is required at
all. Does not the Executive already have the power in
the distribution of Federal funds to apply those conditions
which will enable the Federal Government itself to live
up to the mandate of the Constitution and to require·
States and local government entities to live up to the ·
Constitution, most especially the 5th and 14th amendments?" Id., at 2467.
He then explained that legislation was needed to authorize the ·
termination of funding by the Executive Branch because exist'ing le~islation seemed to coJ1template the expenditure of funds;

"

-
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to support racially segregated institutions. lb-id. The views
of Representatives Celler and Lindsay concerning the purpose
and function of Title VI were shared by other sponsors and
proponents of the legislation in the House.'1 Nowhere is there
any suggestion that Title VI was intended to terminate the
federal funding of programs and activities for any reason other
than the consideration of race or national origin by the recipient institution in a manner inconsistent with the standards
incorporated in the Constitution.
The Senate's consideration of Title VI reveals an identical
understanding concerning the purpose and scope of the legislation: to end segregation and other forms of discrimination
by federal funded projects inconsistent with constitutional
standards. Senator Humphrey. the Senate floor manager,
opened the Senate debate with a section-by-section analysis of
the Civil Rights Act in which he succinctly state the purpose
of Title VI:
"The purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the
United States are not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances the practices of segregation or
discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to
a state agency which engages in racial discrimination. It
may also be so where Federal funds go to support private,
segregated institutions, under the decision in Simki>ns v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (C. A.
4, 1963), cert. denied, March 2, 1964. In all cases, such
discrimination is contrary to national policy. and to the
moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is simply
designed to insure that Federal funds a.re spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the
Nation." Id., at 6544.
9 See, e. g .. 110 Cong. Rec. 2ia2 (Hep. Dawson) ; id., at 2481-2482 (Rep.
Ryan) ; ,id., at 2766 (Rep. Matsunga); id., at 2595 (Rep. Donahue).

-
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Senator Humphrey explained that legislation was needed to
accomplish this objective, in words almost echoing statements
in the House, because it was necessary to eliminate uncer~
tainty concerning the power of federal agencies to t€rminate
financial assistance to programs engaging in racial discrimination in the face of various federal statutes which appeared to
authorize grants to racially segregated institutions. Ibid.
Although Senator Humphrey realized that Title VI reached
conduct which, because of insufficient governmental conduct,
might be beyond the reach of the Constitution, it was clear to
him that the substantive standard imposed by the statute was
that of the Constitution.
Senate supporters of Title VI repeatedly expressed agreement with Senator Humphrey's description of the legislation
as providing, in effect. no more than a. basis for executive
action; that is, the explicit authority and obligation to apply
the standards of the Constitution to all recipients of federal
funds. Senator Ribicoff described the limited function of
Title VI:
"Basically, there is a constitutional restriction against
discrimination in the use of federal funds; and title VI
simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing
that restriction." Id. , at 13333.
Other strong proponents of the legislation in the Senate
repeatedly expressed th eir intent to assure that federal funds
would only be spent in accordance with constitutional standards. See remarks of Senator Pastore (id., at 7057, 7062);
Senator Pell ( id., at 7064); Senator Clark ( id., at 5243);
Senator Allott (id., at 12675. 12677).
There is also language in 42 F. S. C. § 2000d-5, enacted in
1966, which supports the conclusion that Title VI's standards
is that of the Constitutio11. Section 2000d-5 provides that
"for the purpose of determining whether a local educational
agency is in compliance with [Title VI], compliance by such
agen·cy with a final order or judgment of a Federal court fol'

-

-
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the desegregation of the school or the school system operated
by such agency shall be deemed to be compliance with [Title
VI], insofar as the matters covered in the order or judgment
are concerned." This provision was clearly intended to avoid
subjecting local educational agencies simultaneously to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the federal administrative agencies in connection with the imposition of remedial
measures designed to end school segregation. Its inclusion
reflects the congressional judgment that the requirements
imposed by Title VI are identical to those imposed by the
Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts.
Petitioner's contention that Congress intended Title VI to
bar affirmative action programs designed to enable minorities
disadvantaged by the effects of discrimination to participate
in federally financed programs is also refuted by an examination of the type of conduct which Congress thought it was
prohibiting by means of Title VI. The debates reveal that
the legislation was motivated primarily by a desire to eradicate a very specific evil: federal financial support of programs
which disadvantaged Negroes by excluding them from their
benefits or providing them with separate facilities. Again
and again supporters of Title VI emphasized that the purpose
of the statute was to end segregation in federally funded activities and end other discriminatory uses of race disadvantaging Negroes. Senator Humphrey set the theme in his speech
presenting Title VI to the Senate:
"Large sums of money are contributed by the United
States each year for the construction, operation, and
maintenance of segregated schools.

.

.

.

.

.

"Similarly, under the Hill-Burton Act, Federal grants
are made to hospita.ls which admit whites only or Negroes
only.

.

.

.

.

.

" In higher education also, a substantial part of the

-
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Federal grants to colleges, medical schools and so forth, in
the South is still going to segregated institutions.
"Nor is this all. In several States, agricultural extension services, supported by Federal funds , maintain
racially segregated offices for Negroes and whites. . . •
Vocational training courses, supported with Federal funds,
are given in segregated schools and institutions and often
limit Negroes to training in less skilled occupations. In
particular localities it is reported that Negroes have been
cut off from relief rolls, or denied surplus agricultural
commodities, or otherwise deprived of the benefit of federally assisted programs, in retaliation for their participation in voter registration drives, sit-in demonstrations and'
the like." Id., at 6543- 6544.
See also the remarks of Senator Pastore (id., at 7054-7055) ;·
Senator Rihicoff (id., at.7064-7065); remarks of Senator Clark(id., at 5243, 9086); Senator Javits (id. , at 6050, 7102 ) .10
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is clear ..
Congress recognized that Negroes, in some cases with congressional acquiescence, were being discriminated against in the ·
administration of and denied the full benefits of activities '.
receiv'ing federal financial support. It was aware that
·although where state or federal governmental action was sufficiently involved individuals could challenge federally funded
programs which excluded or di.scriminated against Negroes on
constitutional grounds, there were many federally funded programs and institutions which discriminated against minorities
in a manner inconsistent with the standards of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments but whose activities might not
involve sufficient state or federal action so as to be in violaAs has alrea dy been seen, the proponents of Title VI in the House
were motivated by the identica.l concern. See remarks of Representative
'Celler (id., at 2467) ; R epresentative R yan (id., at. 1643, 2481-2482) ; H. R.
Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Additfonal Views of Seven Representatives,· 24-25~
10

-

-
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tion of these Amendments. Moreover, Congress believed that
it was questionable whether the Executive Branch possessed
legal authority to terminate the funding of activities on the
ground that they discriminated racially against Negroes in a
manner violative of the standards contained in the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments. Congress' solution was to end the
Government's complicity in constitutionally forbidden racial
discrimination by providing the Executive Branch with the
authority and the obligation to terminate its financial support of any activity which employed racial criteria in a manner condemned by the Constitution.
The legislative history of Title VI provides no support for
the proposition that Congress intended to impose statutory
limitations upon constitutionally permissible racial preferences
designed to extend the benefits of federally financed programs
to racial minorities such as Negroes that have been historically
excluded from the full benefits of American life as a result of
racial discrimination. Of course the fact that congressional
debate demonstrates Title VI was intended to incorporate the
antidiscrimination standard of the Constitution does not foreclose the contention that the constitutional standard was
perceived to be static rather than developing. It might be
argued that the Congress which enacted Title VI understood
the Constitution to require strict racial neutrality or colorblindness, and then enshrined that concept as a rule of
statutory law. Later interpretation and clarification of the
Constitution to permit remedial use of race would then not
dislodge Title VI's prohibition upon race-conscious action.
Given the clear intent of Congress to enact a statute which
would make available to all the benefits of federa.lly funded
programs that in the past had frequently used federal monies
to either exclude or segregate racial minorities, however, it
would be most surprising if Congress had intended to create a
statutory obstacle to voluntary efforts designed to deal with
•t he effects of past discrimination. Both the structure of Title,

-
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VI and the congressional debate compel rejection of the
hypothesis that Congress intended to bar race-conscious action
for all time. nor do they even establish that Congress understood the Constitution to do so in 1964. · They strongly support the conclusion that the prohibition of voluntary action
employing racial criteria in a manner consistent with the
Constitution for the purposes of eliminating racial discrimination or remedying injuries caused by past racial discrimination
was distant from,~nd, i1~deed, contrary to, the congressional
purpose in enacting Title VI.
First, the legisla.tive history of Title VI, as well as the statute
itself, reveal a desire to induce voluntary compliance with the
requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment. 11 See H. R.
Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec.
13700 (Sen. Pastore); id., at 6546 (Sen. Humphrey). Section
602 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1, provides that "no action
shall be taken [ to terminate funding because of a recipient's
discriminatory actions] until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the
failure to comply with the requirement [ that there be no
discrimination] and has determined that compliance cannot
be secured by voluntary means." It is inconceivable that
Congress intended to encourage voluntary efforts to eliminate
the evil of racial discrimination while at the same time
forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious remedies to
cure acknowledged or obvious statutory violations. Yet a
reading of Title VI as prohibiting all action predicated upon
race which adversely affects any individual would require
recipients guilty of discrimination to await the imposition of
such remedies by the Executive Branch. Indeed. such an
interpretation of Title VI would prevent recipients of federal
funds from taking race into account even when necessary to
bring their programs into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. This would be a remarkable reading of
ll

-

$~ supra, n, 2.

-

16-811-MEMO (A'
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

-

-

19

a statute designed to eliminate constitutional violations, especially in light of judicial decisions holding that under certain
circumstances the remedial use of racial criteria is not only
permissible but is constitutionally required to eradicate constitutional violations. For example, in North Carolina State
Board of Educatwn v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971) , the
Court held that a statute forbidding the assignment of students on the basis of race was unconstitutional because it
would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to
accomplish the desegregation of a school system: "Just as the
race of students must be considered in determining whether
a constitutional violation has occurred. so also race must be
considered in formulating a remedy." Id., at 46. Surely
Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of racial criteria
when constitutionally required or to terminate the funding of
any entity which implemented such a remedy. It clearly
desired to encourage all remedies, including the use of race,
necessary to eliminate racial discrimination in violation of the
Constitution rather than requiring the recipient to await a
judicial adjudication of unconstitutionality and the judicial
imposition of a racially oriented remedy.
A contrary reading of Title VI would have additional consequences undermining the emphasis on voluntary corrective
action contained in the statute. It would , for example, prohibit a recipient of federal funds faced with a decision where
to build a low income housing project from taking into
account the fact that a particular location would tend to promote racial integration. Confronted with the choice of constructing a low income housing project which he anticipated
would be inhabited principally by Negroes in a largely Negro
community. where it would increase racial separa.tion, or in a
mostly white community. where it would further racial integration. he would. other considerations being equal, under a
completely colorblind application of Title VI, have to flip a
coin. The legislators who enacted Title _YI surely did not

-
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intend to compel neutrality toward the effort to eliminate the
legacy left by the Nation 's history of racial injustice. Cf.
Swann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1. 16 (1971).
The fact that Title VI would not prevent the use of racial
criteria by recipients of federal funds in some circumstances
does not, by itself, establish that the statute permits the use
of racial preferences to aid minorities wherever constitutionally permissible. It does mean, however, that if Title VI bars
affirmative action which is consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment, this is not because the statute is absolutely colorblind. Given the premise that Title VI does not prohibit all
uses of race and the strong legislative history indicative of
Congress' desire to assure that the intended beneficiaries of
federal · expenditures were not excluded or discriminated
aga.inst on a racial basis inconsistent with the Constitution,
the view that Title VI, independent of the Fourteenth Amendment, bars a remedial racial preference such as that employed
by the University of California cannot be plausibly maintained in the absence of any explanation of precisely what use
of race it is that Congress desired to prohibit regardless of its
constitutionality. Indeed, it is the considered refusal of the·
proponents of Title VI to give such an explanation that provides the second further source of support for the conclusion
that the statute's prohibitons are coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment's and intended to evolve with the
Cons ti tu tion .
Although it is clear from the debates that the supporters
of Title VI intended to ban uses of race prohibited by the
Constitution and, more specifically, the maintenance of segregated facilities, they never precisely defined the term "discrimination," or what constituted an exclusion from participation
or a denial of benefits on the ground of race. This failure was
not lost upon its opponents. Senator Ervin complained:
''The word 'discrimination,' as used_in this reference,.

-
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has no contextual explanation whatever, other than the
provision that the discrimination 'is to be against' individuals participating in or benefiting from federally assisted
programs and activities on the ground specified. With
this context, the discrimination condemned by this reference occurs only when an individual is treated unequally
or unfairly becau~ of his race, color, religion, or national
origin. What constitutes unequal or unfair treatment?
Section 601 and section 602 of title VI do not say. They
leave the determination of that question to the executive
department or agencies administering each program, without any guideline whatever to point out what is the congressional intent." Id., at 5612.

-

See also remarks of Representative Abernathy (id., at 1619);
Representative Dowdy (i d., at 1632); Sena.tor Talmadge (id.,
at 5251); Senator Spa.r kma.n (id., at 6052). Despite these
criticisms, the legislation's supporters refused to include in the
statute or even provide in debate a more explicit definition of
what Title VI prohibited. The explanation for this failure is
clear. Specific definitions were undesirable, in the views of
the legislation's principal backers, because Title VI's standard
was that of the Constitution and one that could and should be
administratively and judicially applied. See remarks of Senator Humphrey (id. , at 5253, 6553); remarks of Senator Ribicoff (id., at 7057, 13333); Senator Pastore (id. , at 7057);
Senator Javits (id. , at 5606-5607, 6050.) 12 Indeed, there was
a strong emphasis throughout Congress' consideration of
Title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable
flexibility in interpreting and applying the prohibition against
racial discrimination. Attorney General Robert Kennedy tes12 These remarks also reflect the expectaJions of Title VI 's proponents
that, the a pplication of the Constitution to the conduct at the core of their
concern-the segregation of Negroes in federally funded programs and
t heir exclusion from the full benefits of such programs-was clear. See
$wpra, pp. 16-17; infra, _p . 25.
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tified that regulations had not been written into the legislation itself because the rules and regulations defining discrimination might differ from one program to another so that
the term would assume different meanings in different contexts.1 ~ This determination to preserve flexibility in the
administration of Title VI was shared by the legislation's supporters., When Senator Johnston offered an amendment that
would have expressly authorized federal grantees to take race
into account in placing children in adoptive and foster homes,
Senator Pastore opposed the amendment, which was ultimately
defeated by a 56-29 vote, on the ground that federal administrators could be trusted to act reasonably and that there was
no danger that they would prohibit the use of racial criteria
under such circumstances. 110 Cong. Rec., at 13695.
The conclusion compelled by Congress' equation of Title
VI's prohibition with the commands of the Constitution
together with its refusal to precisely define the racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit and its expectation
that the statute would be administered in a flexible manner is
that Congress intended the mea.ning of the statute's prohibition upon discrimination to evolve with the interpretation of
the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not
desire to precisely fix the scope of the nondiscrimination
principle for all time. Such a resolve is not surprising. 1964
was a time when the first judicial applications of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to end public
racial discrimination in America were still recent and the scope
of the nondiscrimination principle was in a state of flux and
rapid evolution. Many questions, such as whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred only de jure discrimination or in at
least some circumstances reached de facto discrimination , had
not yet received an authoritative judicial resolution. The
13

TPstimon~· of Atto rney GPneml Kennedr before the Senate Commit-

tee on the Judiciary on S. 1731 and S. 1750, Legislative History of the
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 398-399•.
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congressional debate reflects an awareness of the evolutionary
change constitutional law in the area of racial discrimination
was undergoing in 1964. 11 Congress chose to leave the precise
definition of the discriminatory use of race which federal funds
could not be used to subsidize to the process of constitutional,
judicial, and administrative interpretation rather than to fix it
for all time.
Thus any cla.im that the use of racial criteria is barred by
the . plain language of the statute must fail in light of the
remedial purpose of Title VI and its legislative history which
demonstrates that it was the unconstitutional use of race
which Congress intended to prohibit. The cryptic nature of
the language employed merely reflects Congress' concern with
the then prevalent use of racial standards as a means of
excluding or disadvantaging Negroes and its determination to
prohibit absolutely such discrimination. We have recently
held that "'{ w ]hen aid to construction of the meaning of
words, as used in the statute. is available, there certainly can
be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the
words may appear on "superficial examination." ' " Train v.
Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10
(1976), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assn.,
310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940). This is espedally so when, as
is the case here, the literal application of what is believed to
be the plain language of the statute, assuming that it is so
plain, would lead to results in direct conflict with Congress'
unequivocally expressed legislative purpose.
There are but a few isolated passages in the legislative
history of Title VI consuming thousands of pages which even
suggest that the legislation was intended to require that
recipients of federal grants under all circumstances administer
their programs in a colorblind fashion. See 110 Cong. Rec.
6547 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6047, 7055 (Sen. Pastore); id.,
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Ree. 6544, 13820 (Sen . Humphrey); id., at 6050
(Sen. Ja,vits) ; id., at 12677 (Sen. Allott}.
14
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at 12675 (Sen. Allott); id., at 6561 (Sen. Kuchel). These
fragmentary comments, however, fall far short of supporting
e. congressional intent to prohibit a racially conscious admissions program designed to assist those who are likely to have
suffered injuries from the effects of past discrimination. In
the first place, these statements must be read in the context
in which they were made. The concern of the speakers was
far removed from the incidental injuries which may be inflicted
upon nonminorities by the use of racial preferences. It was
rather with the evil of the segregation of Negroes in federally
financed programs and. in some cases, their arbitrary exclusion
on account of . race from . the benefits of such programs.
Indeed, in this context there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment does command color blindness and forbids
the use of racial criteria. No consideration was given by
these legislators, however, to the permissibility of racial preferences. designed to redress the effects of injuries suffered as a
result of one's color. Significantly one of the legislators,
.S enator Pastore, and perhaps also Senator Kuchel, who described Title VI as proscribing decisionmaking based upon
skin color, also made it clear that Title VI does not outlaw the
use of racial criteria in all circumstances.'" Moreover, there
are many statements in the legislative history explicitly indicating that Congress intended neither to require nor prohibit
the remedial use of racial preferences where not otherwise·
required or prohibited by the Constitution. Representative·
MacGregor addressed directly the problem of preferential
treatment :
"Your mail and mine, your contacts and mine with our
constituents, indicates a great degree of misunderstanding
about this bill. People complain about racial 'balancing'
in the public schools, about open occupancy in housing,.
about preferential treatment or quotas in employmenL
I

15

See supra, p. 23 ; ·infra, p. 26. Sec al,;o 110 Cong. Rec. 2494 (Rep_

Celler).
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There is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in
these areas in this bill. When we drafted this bill we
excluded these issues largely because the problems raised
by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a governmental level closed to the American
people and by communities and individuals themselves.
The Senate has spelled out our intentions more specifically." Id., at 15893.

-

Other legislators explained that the achievement of racial
balance in elementary and secondary schools where there had
been no segregation by law was not compelled by Title VI but
was rather left to the judgment of state and local communities.
See, e. g., id., at 10920 (Sen. Javits); id., at 5807, 5266 (Sen.
Keating); id., at 13821 (Sens. Humphrey and Saltonstall).
See also, id., at 6562 (Sen. Kuchel); id., at 13695 (Sen.
Pastore).
Much the same can be said of the scattered remarks to be
found in the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-1 et seq., which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race in terms somewhat similar to those contained in Title vr,1u to the effect that
any deliberate attempt by an employer to maintain a racial
balance is not required by the statute and might in fact violate
it. 17 Once again. there is no indication that Congress intended
to bar the voluntary use of racial preferences to assist minorities to surmount the obstacles imposed by the remnants of
past discrimination. Even assuming that Title VII prohibits
employers from deliberately maintaining a particular racial
composition in their work force as an end in itself, this does
not imply, in the absence of aJ1y consideration of the question,
10 Title VII mahs it unla.wful for ru1 employe.r "to fail or refuse to hire"
any applicant "because . of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin . . ..." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) .
17
See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 6549
(Sen. Humphrey); id., a.t 2560 (Rep. Goodell) .
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that Congress inten<le,1 to bar the use of racial preferences as
a tool for achieving the objective of remedying past discrimination or other compelJing e11ds. The former may well be
contrary to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
(where state actiou is involved). while the latter presents very
different constitutional considerations. Indeed. as discussed
infra, this Court has construed Title VII as requiring the use
of racial preferences for the purpose of hiring and advancing
those who have been adversely affected by past discriminatory
employment practices. Although Title VII clearly does not
require employers to take action to remedy the disadvantages
imposed upon racial minorities by hands other than their own,
such an objective is pPrfectly consistent with the rem.edial
goals of the statute. 1 8 There is no more indication in the
legislative history of Title VII than in that of Title VI that
Congress desired to prohibit such affirmative action to the
extent that it is permitted by the Constitution. 19

B
Section 602 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1, instructs
federal agencies to promulgate regulations interpreting Title
VI. These regulations, which require, under the terms of the
statute, Presidential approval, are entitled to considerable
deference in construing Title VI. We have repeatedly recognized that regulations expressly authorized by statute and
reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation are
entitled to great weight. See, e. g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S.
563 (1964); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
411 U.S. 356. 369 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381 (1965). Consequently, it is most significant
See Franks v. Bo1cma.11 Trausporta.tion Co ., 424 U. S. 747, 762-770
(1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975) .
1 'J Subsequent judicial di>ci,-ion~ a.• wi>II as exer11ti,·p and congres:sional
18

action clearly establish that Title VII does not forbid race conscious
remedial action. See infra, pp. 38-39, and n. 30.
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that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), which provides much of the federal assistance to
institutions of higher education , has adopted regulations
requiring a@rma!Jve measures designed to enable racial minorities whichllave been pre; iously discriminated against by a
federally funded institution or program to overcome the effects
of such actions and authorizing the voluntary undertakin of
affirmative action programs y e era y un e institutions
which have n ot been guilt y of prior discrimination in order
to overcome the effects of conditions which have adversely
affected the degree of participation by persons of a particular
race.
45 CFR § 80.3 (b) (6) (i) provides:
"In administering a program regarding which the
recipient has previously discriminated against persons on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient
must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of
prior discrimination ."
45 CFR § 80.5 (i) elaborates upon this requirement:
"In some situations, even though past discriminatory
practices attributable to a recipient or applicant have
beep abandoned, the consequences of such practices continue to impede the full availability of a benefit. If the
efforts required of the applicant or recipient under § 80.6
( d), to provide information as to the availability of the
program or activity and the rights of beneficiaries under
this regulation , have failed to overcome these consequences, it will become necessary under the requirement
stated in (i) of § 80.3 (b)(6) for such applicant or
recipient to take additional steps to make the benefits
fully available to racial and nationality groups previously
subject to discrimination. This action might take the
form , for example, of special arrangements for obtaining
referral& Qr making selections whicq. will insure that:

-
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groups previously subjected to discrimination are adequately served."
These regulations clearly establish that where there is a need
to overcome the effects of past ra.cially. discriminatory or
exclusionary practices engaged in by a federally funded institution, race-conscious action is not only permitted but required
to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. 2 n Of Course, (
there is no evidence that the Medical School has been uilty
of past discrimination an consequently these regulations
would not coinpel it to emplo a ro ram of preferential
admiss10ns m e alf of racial minorities. It wou
e iffi.cult
to explain
the la~ uage of Title VI, however, much less
from its legislative history. why the statute compels race conscious remedies where a recipient institution has engaged in
past discrimination but prohibits such remedial action where
racial minorities as a result of the effects of past discrimination
imposed by entities other than the recipient are excluded
from the benefits of federally funded programs. HEW was
fully aware of the incongruous nature of such an interpretation
of Title VI.
45 CFR § 80.3 (b) ( 6) (ii) provides:
"Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a
recipient in administering a program may take affirma.tive
action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted
in limiting participation by person~ of a particular race,
color, or national origin."
An explanatory regula.tion explicitly states that the affirmative

ho~

-

20 H E W !ms st a.tee! tl wt t he pnrpo~e of the~r rrgulnt ions i:; " to specify
t hat. nffirmative steps to mnke servi crs more equit nbl~· a.vnilable nre not
prohibited nnd tlrnt such steps nre required when neceS&'l r~· to overcome
t he consequences of prior disrrimina.tion ." 36 Fed. Reg. 23494 (1971) ,
·Ot.her federnl ngencies which provide finn.ncinl n&;istnnce pursunnt to
Title VI hnve ndopted similnr regulations. See Supplementnl Brief for
·the United States as am,icus curiae, 16 J1 . 14,
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action which § 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) contemplates includes the use
of racial preferences:
"Even though an applicant or recipient has never used
discriminatory policies, the services and benefits of the
program or activity it administers may not in fact be
equally available to some racial or nationality groups. In
such circumstances, an applicant or recipient may properly give special consideration to race, color, or national
origin to make the benefits of its program more widely
available to such groups, not then being adequately
served. For example, where a university is not adequately serving members of a particular racial or nationality group, it may establish special recruitment policies
to make its program better known and more readily
available to such group, and take other steps to provide
that group with more adequa.te service." 45 CFR § 80.5
(j).
This interpretation of Title VI is fully consistent with the
statute's emphasis upon voluntary remedial action and reflects
the views of au agency 21 responsible for achieving its
objectives. 22
21
:Vforeover, the Pre~ident has delegated to the Attorne~· General responi-:ibilit~- for coordinating the enforcement of Title VI by federal department~ and agencies and has directed him t.o "assist the departments and
agencies in accomplishing effective implementation ." Executive Order No.
11764, 39 Fed. Reg. 2575 (1974). According!~-. the views of the Solicitor
General that. the use of racial preferences for remedial purposes is consistent with Title VI, as well as those of HEW, are entitled to considerable
respect.
2
• HEW administers nt least two explicit.I~- race-conscious programs.
Details concerning them may be found in the 1977 Catalogue of Federal
Domestic Assista.nce, pp. 205-206, 401-402. The first. program , No. 13375, "Minority Biomedical Support," has ns its objectives:
"To increase the number of ethnic minority faculty, students, and invest igators engaged in biomedical research. To broaden the opportunities for
participation in biomedical research of ethnic minority faculty, students,
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The Court has recognized that the construction of a statute
by those charged with its execution is particularly deserving
of respect where Congress has directed its attention to the
administrative con structiou and left it unaltered. Cf. R ed
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1968) ;
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U . S. 1, 11-12 ( 1965). Congress recently
took just this kind of action when it considered an amendment
to the Departments of Labor and Health, Education. and Welfare appropriation bill for 1978 which would have restricted significantly the remedial use of race in programs funded by the
·appropriation. The amendment, as originally submitted by
Representative Ashbrook, provided that "[n]one of the funds
appropriated in this Act may be used to initiate, carry ·out or
enforce any program of affirmative action or any other system
of quotas or goals in regard to admission policies or employment practices which encourage or require any discrimination
on the basis of race, creed , religion , sex or age." 123 Cong.
Rec. 6099. In support of the measure, Representative Ashbrook argued ·that the 1964 Civil Rights Act never authorized
the imposition of affirmative action and that this wa& a creation of the bureaucracy. Id., at 6106. He explicitly stated,
however, that he favored permitting universities to adopt
· affirmative action programs giving consideration to racial
a.nd investigators by providing support for biomedica.l resea rch programs
a.t eligible institutions."
E ligibility for grants under this program is limited to (1) four-year colleges, universities, and hea lth professional schools with over 50% minority
enrollments; (2) four-year institutions with significant but not necessa.rily
over 50% minority enrollment provided t hey have a history of encouragement and assistance to minorities; (3) t wo-yea.r colleges with 50% minority
enrollment; and (4) American Indian Tribal Councils. Grants ma.de pursuant to this program are estimated to total $9,711,000 for 1977.
The second program , No. 13 ,880, entitled "Minority Access To Resea rch
Careers," has as its objective to "assist minority institutions to train
· ~rea.ter numbers of scientists and tea.chers in health related fi elds." Grants
under this program are made directly to individuaJs and to institutions
io r the purpo$0 of enabling them to make grants to individuals.
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identity but opposed the imposition of such programs by the
Government. Id., at 6099. His amendment was itself
amended to reflect this position by only barring the imposition
of race-conscious remedies by HEW:
"None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be
obligated or expended in connection with the issuance,
implementation, or enforcement of any rule, regulation,
standard, guideline, recommendation, or order issued by
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare which
for purposes of compliance with any ratio, quota, or other
numerical requirement related to race, creed, color, national origin, or sex requires any individual or entity to
take any action with respect to ( 1) the hiring or promotion policies or practices of such individual or entity, or
(2) the admissions policies or practices of such individual or entity." Id., at 6106.
'fhis amendment was adopted by the House. Ibid. The
Senate bill, h,owever, contained no such restriction upon
HEW's authority to impose race-conscious remedies and the
Conference Committee, upon the urging of the Secretary of
HEW, deleted the House provision from the bill. 2 3 Accordingly, it appears that after full consideration of the question
Congress has left unaltered HEW regulations requiring the
remedial use of race to eliminate the effects of past discriminatory practices. More significant for present purposes,
however. is the fact that even the proponents of imposing
limitations upon HEW's implementation of Title VI did not
challenge the right of federally funded educational institutions voluntarily to extend preferences to racial minorities.
There is 110 basis for us to act where Congress has considered
the matter a.nd remained silent.
Indeed, congressional action subsequent to the passage of
23 SN· · Confcrencr Report to accompany H. R. 7555, at. 22; 123 Cong.
Rec. H. 8330. Firutl passage of the bill has been delayed by the dispute
,over the funding of abortions.
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Title VI eliminates any possible doubt about Congress' views
concerning the permissibility of racial preferences for the purpose of assisting disadvantaged racial minorities. It confirms
that Congress did not intend to prohibit and does not now
believe that Title VI prohibits the consideration of race as part
of a remedy for societal discrimination even where there is
n0 showing that the institution extending the preference has
. been gutlty of past discrimination nor any judicial finding that
the particular beneficiaries of the racial preference have been
adversely affected by societal discrimination.
Just last year Congress enacted legislation 2 4 explicitly
requiring that no grants shall be made "for any local public
works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance
to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of
each grant sha.ll be expended for minority business enterprises." The statute defines the term "minority business
enterprise" as "a business, at least 50 per centum of which
·is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which
· is owned by minority group members." The term "minority
group members" is defined in explicitly racial terms: "citizens
of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Although the statute contains an exemption from this requirement "to the
extent that the Secreta.r y determines otherwise," this escape
clause was provided only to deal with the possibility that certain areas of the country might not contain sufficient qualified
"minority business enterprises" to permit compliance .with the
quota provisions of the legislation .2 5
The legislative history of this race-conscious legislation
reveals that it represents a deliberate attempt to deal with
· the excessive rate of unemployment among minority citizens
and to encourage the development of viable minority con42
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trolled enterprises. 2 6 It was believed that such a "set-aside"
was required in order to enable minorities, still "new on the
scene'~ and "relatively small," to compete with larger and
more established companies which would always be successful
in underbidding minority enterprises. 123 Cong. Rec. 1437
(Rep. Mitchell). What is most significant about the congressional consideration of the measure is that although the use
of a racial quota or "set-aside" by a recipient of federal funds
would constitute a direct violation of Title VI if that statute
were read to prohibit race-conscious action, no mention was
made during the debates in either the House or the Senate of
even the possibility that the quota provisions for minority
contractors might in any way conflict with or modify Title VI.
It is inconceivable that such a purported conflict would have
escaped congressional attention through an inadvertent failure to recognize the relevance of Title VI. Indeed, the Act
of which this affirmative action provision is a part also contains a. provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex
which states that this prohibition "will be enforced through
agency provisions and rules similar to those already established , with respect to racial and other discrimination under
Title Vl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 42 U.S. C. § 6709.
Thus Coi1gress was fully aware of the applicability of Title VI
to the funding of public works projects. Under these circumstances, the enactment of the 10% "set-aside" for minority
enterprises reflects a congresssional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title VI. We have
repeatedly recognized that subsequent legislation reflecting an
interpretation of an earlier act is entitled to great weight in
determining the meaning of the earlier statute. Red Lion
Broadcastiny Co. v. FCC, 396 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1968);
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243-244 (1972).
See also United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1940).
In addition to the enactment of the 10% quota provision
iG
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discussed supra, Congress has also passed other acts mandatfog race-conscious measures to overcome disadvantages experienced by racial minorities. Although these statutes have less
direct bearing upon the meaning of Title VI, they do demonstrate that Congress believes race-conscious remedial measures
to be both permissible and desirable under at least some circumstances. This in turn undercuts the likelihood that Congress intended to limit voluntary efforts to implement similar
measures. For example, § 7 (a) of the National Science
Foundation Authorization Act of 1977 2 • provides:
"The Director of the National Science Foundation shall
initiate an intensive search for qualified women, members
·of minority groups, and handicapped individuals to fill
executive level positions in the National Science Foundation. In carrying out the requirement of this subsection,
the Director shall work closely with organizations which
have been active in seeking greater recognition and utilization of the scientific and technical capabilities of minori~
ties, women, and handicapped individuals. The Director
shall improve the representation of minorities, women,
and handicapped individuals on advisory committel;)s,
review panels, and all other mechanisms by which
the scientific community provides assistance to the
Foundation."
Perhaps more importantly, the Act also authorizes the funding of Minority Centers for Graduate Education. The Act
requires that these Centers:
"(A) have substantial minority student enrollment;
"(B) are geographically located near minority population centers;
"(C) demonstrate a commitment to encouraging and
assisting minority students, researchers, and faculty;

27
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"(F) will serve as a regional resoul'ce in science and
engineering for the minority community which the Center is designed to serve; and
"(G) will develop joipt educational programs with
nearby undergraduate institutions of higher education
which have a substantial minority student enrollment."
Once again, there is no indication in the legislative history of
this Act or elsewhere that Congress saw any inconsistency
between the race-conscious nature of such legislation and the
meaning of Title VI. And once again, it is unlikely in the
extreme that a Congress which believed that it had commanded recipients of federal funds to be absolutely colorblind
would itself expend federal funds in such a race-conscious
manner. 28

C

-

Prior decisions of this Court also strongly suggest that
Title VI does not prohibit the remedial use of race where such
action is constitutionally permissible. In Lau v. Nichols, 414
U. S. 563 (1974), the Court held that the failure of the San
Francisco school system to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak English,
or to provide them with instruction in Chinese, constituted
a violation of Title VI. The Court relied upon a HEW
regulation which stipulates that a recipient of federal funds
"may not ... utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect
·individuals of a particular race. color, or national origin."
45 CFR § 80.3 (b)(2). It interpreted this regulation as
requiring San Francisco to extend the same educational benefits
to Chinese speaking students as to English speaking students,
28

See al~o the Railroad R evitalization Act"- of 197f\, --l5 U . S. C. § 801

et seq., 49 U. S. C. § 1657 et seq.; the Emergency Sohool Aid Act of 191'2,
'20 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq.
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though tlwrr was no findi11g: or allf'g;ation that the city's
failure to do so was a result of a, purposeful design t-0 discriminate on the basis of role.
Lau is significant in two relaU>d respects. First. it indicates
that in at least some circumstances agencies responsible for
the administration of Tit,le VJ may require recipients who
ha,ve not been guilty of any constitutional viola.tions to depart
from a. policy of colorblindness and be cogniza.nt of the impact
of their actions upon racial minorities. Secondly. Lau clearly
requires that institutions receiving federa.l funds be accorded
considerable latitude in voluntarily undertaking race-conscious
action designed to remedy the exclusion of significant numbers of minorities from the benefits of federally funded programs. Although this Court has not yet considered the question-, presumably, by analogy to our decisions construing
TitlP VU. a medical school would 11ot be in violation of Title
VT un<ler Lau because of the serious underrepresentation of
racial minorities in its studf'nt body as long as it could
demonstrate that its entrance requirements corrf'latf'd sufficiently with thf' performa11ce of minority students in medical
school and the medical professio11. 1 " It would be inconsistent
with Lau and the emphasis of Title VI and the HEW regulations on volu11tary action. however, to req1.1ire that an institutio11 wait to bf' adjudicated to be in violation of the law before
being pf'rmitted to voluntarily undertake corrective action
based upon a goo<l faith and reasonable belief that the failure
of certain racial minorities to satisfy entrance requirements is
not a measure of their ultimate performance as doctors but a
result of th<· lingering effects of past societal discrimination.
I recognize that Lau, especially in light of our subsequent
decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which
rcjectf'd the co11te11tiou that governmental action is unconstitutional solely because it has a racial1y disproportionate
C'YPll
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impact, must be read as being predicated upon the view that
at least unuer some circumstances Title VI proscribes conduct which may JlOt be prohibited by the Constitution.
Since [ am now of the opinion. for the reasons set forth
above, that Title vTs standarcJ. appiicable alike to public
and private re~ipients of federal funds. is no broader than
the Constitution·s. I have serious doubts concerning the
correctness of the premise of that decision. Even accepting
Lau's implication, however, that impact alone is in some contexts sufficient to establish at least a prima facie violation of
Title VI, contrary to my view that Title Vi's definition of
racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's, this would not assist Bakke in the least. First, for
the reasons discussed supra, pp. 18-36, regardless of whether
Title Vi's prohibitions extend beyond the Constitution's, the
evidence fails to establish, and, indeed, compels the rejection
of, the proposition that Congress intended to prohibit recipients of federal funds from voluntarily employing raceconscious measures to eliminate the effects of past societal
discrimination against racial minorities such as Negroes.
Secondly, Lau itself, for the reasons set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, strongly supports the view that
voluntary race-conscious remedial action is permissible under·
Title VI. If discriminatory racial impact is alone enough to
demonstrate a Title VI violation , it is difficult to believe that
the Title would forbid the Medical School from attempting to
correct the racially exclusionary effects of its initial admissions
policy during its first two years of operatioi1.
The Court has also declined to adopt a "colorblind'' interpretation of other statutes containing n011discrimiation provisions similar to that contained in Title VI. We have held
under Title VII that where employment requirements have a
disproportionate impact upon racial minorities they constitute
a statutory violation. even in the absence of discriminatory
ji1tent, unless the employer is able to; d_
ernonstrate that the

-

76-811-MEMO (A)

38

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA REGENTS v. BAKKE

. requirements arc sufficiently related to the needs of the
JUIJ. , 1\i1ore significantly, the Court has required that preferences be given by employers to members of racial minorities as a remedy for past violations of Title VH, even where
there has been no finding that the employer has acted unconstitutionally; that is, with a discriminatory intent. 3 1 Finally,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co .. 401 F. S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
;n Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) ; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Executive, judicial, and co11gressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively estab 0
lished that the Title did not bar flrn remedial use of race. Prior to the
1972 amendments to Title VII (The Equal Opportunities Employment Act
of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261) a, number of courts of appeals approvro raceconscious action to remedy the effects of employment discrimination. See,
e. g., Local 53, International Assn. of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos
Workers v. Vog'ler, 407 F . 2d 1047 (CA5 1969); United States v. International Brotherhood of Elect1ical Workers. Local 38, 428 F. 2d 144, 149-159
(CA6) , oort. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S. Ct. 245, 27 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1970);
United States v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 36. 416 F . 2d 123 (CA8 1969).
In 1965, the President issued Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, as
amended 32 Fed. Reg . 14:ma. which re411ired fedc>ral cont.ractors to take
affirmative action to counteract the disproportionately low employment. of
racial minorities in the construction industry. The Attorney General
issued an opinion concluding t.lrnt the race consciousness required by
Executive Order 11246 did not conflict with Title VII:
"It is not correct to say that Title VII prohibits employers from making
ra.ce or national origin a factor for consideration a,t any stage in the
process 'of obtaining employees. The legal definition of discrimination is
an evolving one, but. it is now well recognized in judicial opinions that
t he obligation of nondiscrimination , whether imposed ·by statute or by the
Constitution, does not require and, in some circumstances, may not permit
-obliviousness or indifference to the racial consequences of alternative
courses of action which involve the application of outwardly neutra.J
criteria,." ·42 Op. AG No. 37 (1969), at 7.
The federal courts agreed. See, e. g., Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa: v.
-Sec retary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3) , cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854
(1971) {which also held, at 173, that race conscioµs affirmative action
was permissible under Title VI) ; Southern Illinois Builders Assn. v.
Ogilvie, 471 F . 2d 680 (CA7 1972). Moreover, Congress, in e1mcting the
30
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we have construed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 lI. S. C.
§ 1973, which contains a provirion barring any voting proce•dure or qualification that deuies or abridges "the right of any
citizens of the United States to vote 011 account of race or
color." as permitting States to voluntarily take race into
account in a way that fairly represents the voting strengths
of different racial groups in order to comply with the commands of the statute.'j"
These prior decisions are indicative of the Court's unwillingness to construe remedial statutes designed to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities in a manner which would
impede efforts to obtain this objective. There is 110 justifica-· )
tion for departing from this course in the case of Title VI and
frustrating the clear judgment of Congress that ra.ce-conscioas
remedial action is permissible.

1972 amendments to Title VII, explicitly considered and rejected proposals
to a.It.er Executive Order 11246 and the prevailing juclicial interpretations
of Title VII as permitting, and in some circumstances requiring, race conscion-s action. See Comment, The Philadelphia Plan : A Study on the
Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Chi . L . Rev. 732 , 747-757 (1972).
TI1e section-by-section analysis of the 1972 amendments to Title VII
undertaken by the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Publi c Welfare reveals a. resolve to a.ccept the then (as
now) prevailing judicial interpretations of the scope of Title VII:
"In a.n y area where the new law does not address itself, or in any areas
where a specific contrary intent. is not indicated , it was assumed that
the present case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern
the applicability and construction of Title VII." Legislative History of
Equal Opportunities Employment Act of 1972, at 1844.
32
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